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Abstract
The medical community often argues that physician fear of legal liability increases
health care spending. Theoretically, though, the effect could be positive or negative,
and empirical evidence has supported both cases. Previous empirical work, however,
has ignored the fact that physicians face risk from industry oversight groups like state-
level medical licensing boards in addition to civil litigation risk. This paper addresses
this omission by incorporating previously unused data on punishments by oversight
groups against physicians, known as adverse actions, along with malpractice payments
data to study state-level health care spending. My analysis suggests that health care
spending does not rise in response to higher levels of risk. An increase in adverse
actions equal to 16 (the mean, absolute value of year-to-year changes within a state) is
found to be associated with statistically significant average annual spending decreases
in hospital care and prescription drugs of as much as 0.25% (nearly $29 million) and
0.29% (almost $9.3 million). Malpractice payments were generally estimated to have
smaller, statistically insignificant effects.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates whether malpractice risk faced by physicians, which originates pri-
marily through the civil litigation system and state-level medical licensing boards, induces
changes in the overall cost of health care in the United States. The predominant belief in
the medical field is that physicians are overly cautious in their treatment recommendations
for patients out of fear of malpractice allegations (Studdert et al., 2005; Bishop et al., 2010;
Sirovich et al., 2011; American Medical Association, 2012b). This phenomenon, often re-
ferred to as defensive medicine, is thought to cause increased spending on treatments not
warranted by medical need. These views have led physicians to call for protection from
legal liability in the practice of medicine (Bishop et al., 2010; American Medical Association,
2012a) – calls that have found a receptive audience in the public sector. As of 2006, 26 states
had adopted laws limiting malpractice lawsuit damages (Mello, 2006a), and there have been
efforts to pass national limits to damages 1.
The public discourse on the subject of defensive medicine, however, often ignores the
fact that the theoretical response by physicians to malpractice risk is ambiguous. The U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1994) first formalized this ambiguity by defining
positive defensive medicine as when physicians order extra medical services to avoid legal
liability, and negative defensive medicine as when they avoid patients or services out of lia-
bility fears. In the academic literature, both of these possibilities were incorporated into an
economic model by Currie and MacLeod (2008). The uncertainty goes further, though, since
even if we know for certain in which direction medical services provided moves in response to
risk, the spending result would still be ambiguous. For example, physicians might respond
to risk by performing more preventative services – which is positive defensive medicine –
but which may result in lower spending if more expensive services are prevented2. Similarly,
avoidance behavior by physicians – negative defensive medicine – could actually increase
spending if it leads to more expensive problems in enough of the avoided patients. The
empirical literature on the subject of defensive medicine reflects these theoretical ambigu-
ities. Kessler and McClellan (1996) found that laws restricting malpractice damages were
associated with decreased spending in heart condition patients, but Currie and MacLeod
(2008) found they resulted in increased use of C-section procedures in births. Other authors
generally found small effects or no statistically significant evidence for defensive medicine
(Dubay et al., 1999, 2001; Baicker et al., 2007; Kim, 2007; Carrier et al., 2010; Thomas et
1One recent attempt was the Protecting Access to Healthcare Act, H.R. 5, 112th Congress (2012). The
bill was passed by the House of Representatives but not the senate.
2It is not clear such a scenario would be possible, though, as some research has questioned whether
preventative care is any more cost effective than ex-post treatment (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008)
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al., 2010). Lakdawalla and Seabury (2012) found defensive medicine had moderate effects
on spending growth, but argued these costs were justified by reduced mortality3.
My analysis introduces new evidence on the matter by exploiting a previously untapped
measure of risk, the state-level frequency of sanctions taken against physicians by indus-
try oversight groups, such as medical boards, Medicare, Medicaid, and hospitals. Known
as adverse actions, these sanctions are punishments against physicians for professional mis-
conduct, such as incompetent care or breaking certain types of laws, and are intended to
motivate doctors to maintain high quality (Shryock, 1967). Actions taken by state medical
boards generally involve restrictions on the physician’s license (e.g. probation, suspension,
revocation), and actions taken by other organizations are similar conceptually though smaller
in scope (e.g. a hospital may suspend clinical privileges). From the perspective of physi-
cians, adverse actions represent a threat that is similar to malpractice litigation risk. Both
could result from an alleged medical malpractice incident, and both have potentially large
monetary impacts (adverse actions through the inability to practice either temporarily or
permanently). Thus, the risk originating from adverse actions could potentially induce de-
fensive medicine and affect spending in the same ways that have been argued for litigation
risk.
This paper contributes to the literature by performing the first analysis combining and
comparing both of these different types of malpractice risk. Previous work has all focused on
the civil litigation risk, leaving a gap in our knowledge regarding the effects of adverse action
risk. This is an important discrepancy since the risk posed by adverse actions is one that
physicians do not insure against. In contrast, nearly all physicians carry insurance against
civil litigation risk (Mello, 2006b), rendering their medical treatment decisions irrelevant to
their expected monetary malpractice litigation costs 4. Some previous authors (e.g. Kessler
and McClellan, 1996) have, therefore, suggested that the primary mechanism behind defen-
sive medicine would be indirect or noneconomic costs associated with malpractice litigation,
such as reputation effects, stress, or time spent defending against allegations. While this
certainly could be the case, a physician facing an adverse action from the state medical
board (for example) would face all these same costs in addition to potential economic con-
sequences, since no insurance is available for adverse actions. Thus, if physicians do respond
3In an international context, Chen and Yang (2014) found evidence of positive defensive medicine in
Taiwan.
4Malpractice litigation insurance is unlike some other forms of insurance in that it is not experience
rated, meaning the claims experiences of individual physicians do not affect the rates they pay for insurance.
Instead, malpractice insurance is generally priced based on specialty and geography (Sloan, 1990; Fournier
and McInnes, 2001; Mello, 2006b). From the perspective of individual physicians, therefore, malpractice
insurance premiums are fixed costs, because their own choices regarding services recommendations have
negligible influence on their own insurance rates.
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to malpractice litigation risk that they carry insurance for, it would then seem reasonable
to expect that they would also respond to risk originating from adverse actions.
Measurement of both malpractice payments and adverse actions is possible through the
use data made publicly available by the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). Federal
law mandates reporting of both adverse actions and malpractice payments to the NPDB, so
this unique government database allows observation of the entire universe (or close to it) of
these variables. Using this data, I estimate the effect of changes in the frequency of malprac-
tice payments and adverse actions over a 16 year period on health care expenditures at the
state level. I find evidence suggesting that increases in adverse actions against physicians
are associated with lower health care expenditures. One additional action taken against a
physician each year is estimated to decrease average state hospital expenditures by as much
as 1.6 hundredths of a percent. For spending on prescription drugs, the reduction is as much
as 1.8 hundredths of a percent. At the same time, I estimate that malpractice payments gen-
erally have much smaller, statistically insignificant effects, a result that is consistent with the
argument that physician incentives for responding to malpractice litigation risk are muted
due to insurance. To the extent that doctors do in fact respond to this type of risk, though,
my results suggest that it also decreases spending since in most cases I estimate coefficients
with negative signs.
2 Empirical investigation
2.1 Econometric model
The primary focus of my empirical investigation is to estimate the influence of malpractice
risk on state-level health care spending categories. In particular, I estimate linear panel data
models of the form:
ln(SPENDst) = αs + α˜st+ βt +X
′
stγ +NPDB
′
stδ + st. (1)
Indexes s and t indicate the state and year, while ln(SPENDst) represents the natural log
of state-level, real health care expenditures. Column vectors NPDBst and Xst contain mea-
sures of the malpractice risk environment (per the NPDB data) and other control variables,
respectively. State fixed-effects are represented by αs, and α˜st indicates state-specific, linear
time-trends (accounting for long-term, state-specific growth-differences in spending). Year
dummy variables are represented by βt, while γ and δ are column vectors of parameters
representing marginal effects on health spending. The Xst vector is comprised of the number
of non-federally employed medical doctors in the state, the state population, and the number
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of state residents with private health insurance, Medicaid, and Medicare (all of which are
expressed in thousands). Additionally, it contains the number of practicing lawyers in the
state (also in thousands), which serves as a measure of the costliness of accessing the state
legal system.
The NPDBst vector is comprised of two yearly count variables: total physicians who
received at least one adverse action and total physicians associated with at least one mal-
practice payout. These variables serve as proxies for the actual probabilities faced by physi-
cians of adverse actions and malpractice payments, and are the primary variables of interest.
I construct these measures using data from the NPDB, and so, for brevity, I will at times
refer to these jointly as the “NPDB variables”. The introduction of adverse actions and
malpractice payments as two separate, linear terms is intended to reflect the argument that
physicians view both as potentially affecting them via the same mechanism.
I estimate equation (1) for each of four categories of expenditures: hospital care, physi-
cian and clinical services, prescription drugs, and other non-durable medical products (the
last category being a placebo category). All models are estimated using the within esti-
mator, with state-level, cluster-robust standard errors to account for potential serial cor-
relation(Cameron et al., 2011)5. Note that since the dependent variable is in logarithms,
the reported estimates for all coefficients are interpreted as percentage changes in spending
due to one unit changes in the independent variables. All reported estimates, though, are
multiplied by 100 for presentation purposes in the tables below.
2.2 Identification
One of the primary advantages of using the NPDB variables for this type of analysis is that
they reflect input from the entire system that oversees physicians, including bureaucratic
processes, behaviors of juries and judges, and the litigiousness of the population. The benefits
of this as compared to an identification strategy based on changes in tort laws can be seen
in a simple example. Suppose a state enacts a damages cap for malpractice lawsuits, but
that before the law was passed, there were few allegations of malpractice made in the state
in the first place. Upon observing little change in spending, one might conclude that the
damages cap had little effect on spending. This conclusion would be faulty, however, because
what really happened was there was no real change in the risk level faced by physicians. As
there was little enforcement, the change in the law was rendered irrelevant. The NPDB
variables, though, would reflect the minimal presence of regulation both before and after the
law change, and therefore would more fully account for the risk levels in the state.
5All regression estimates, including standard errors, were implemented using the “xtreg” command of
Stata/SE 12.1 for Windows StataCorp (2011).
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Despite this advantage, the use of the NPDB variables as measures of malpractice risk
requires careful discussion of the basis for identification. Of first order concern is the threat of
endogeneity, since the NPDB variables result from the interaction of the regulatory, litigation,
and medical environments in a state. One step I took to address part of these concerns was
to rely a frequency count of malpractice payments instead of a measure of the dollar value of
payments or other dollar denominated measures like malpractice insurance premiums. This
addresses the possibility of bias caused by trends in health care prices and utilization, which
obviously play roles in determining health care spending, but that also contribute to the
dollar value of malpractice payments and insurance premiums. For malpractice payments,
this is because payments are often set to cover some or all of the medical bills of the accusing
party. In the case of malpractice insurance premiums, the link comes from the fact that most
malpractice payments are actually made by insurers, and premiums are set to help cover the
cost of making these payments.
Avoiding dollar based measures of risk only addresses a portion of the endogeneity con-
cerns, though. Another threat is that the NPDB variables may not only reflect pure enforce-
ment, but may also, to some extent, reflect the rate that malpractice occurs in the state. For
example, it may be the case that when there is more actual malpractice – perhaps due to
generally worse doctors – there are more accusations and stronger cases against physicians,
resulting in more observed payments or adverse actions. Basing estimation on measures of
regulatory risk that are contaminated in this way could possibly cause misleading results. To
reduce the severity of this threat, I include state-level fixed effects in my regressions to ac-
count for time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity at the state-level, including state-specific
malpractice rates. Furthermore, I also include state-specific, linear time trends to account
for time-varying heterogeneity that occurs in a linear fashion. These steps would still, how-
ever, leave the possibility of non-linear time variation in malpractice rates influencing my
results. The nature of the NPDB variables, however, provides a solution to this issue. Each
malpractice payment and adverse action is the end result of a legal process that begins in
year t1 with the original incident or injury of the accusing patient. The original incident is
possibly a reflection of the malpractice rate since the patient may have received substandard
care resulting in injury, but my analysis does not count the incident until the end of the
legal process in year t2, when a payment is made or an action taken against a physician by
an oversight group. These measures are then paired via regression with outcome measures
of spending for the corresponding year, t2. Thus, the NPDB variables used in my analysis
are implicitly lag variables: to the extent that they measure the malpractice rate in the
state, they measure it as of t2 − t1 years before the measurement of the dependent variable
in my regressions, state health care spending. In the case of malpractice payments, the
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NPDB data shows that t2− t1 is usually quite a long time, as the median payment occurred
four years after the incident from which it originated, with the tenth percentile being two
years after, and the ninetieth percentile, eight years after. The NPDB does not have the
information necessary to determine the time lag for adverse actions, but statistics posted
to the website of the Medical Board of California (2010) indicate that the legal process for
actions on a physician’s license is also quite long, with the sum of the median number of
days for the stages of the complaint process exceeding 600 days (and rising) since fiscal year
1999/2000. Category averages for each stage of the medical board legal process also exceed
their medians, usually significantly so.
Given this lag aspect of the NPDB variables, the malpractice rate in a state could only
influence my estimates if the malpractice rate in year t1 has a direct influence on health
spending several years after the fact, in year t2. Thus, the validity of my estimates relies
on the assumption that malpractice rates of years past do not influence spending in the
current year. This assumption can be argued to be reasonable because previous research has
suggested that the effect of actual malpractice – as in injuries to patients due to medical
errors – on health spending is minimal, regardless of the year. A paper from a large study
of medical injuries in Utah and Colorado by Thomas et al. (1999) estimated that “adverse
events” – injuries caused by medical management, but not necessarily reflecting negligence
– accounted for about 4% of national health expenditures in 1996. Only about half of
these costs, though, were due to spending on health care (the rest was lost wages and home
production). The amount of adverse events attributable to negligence (i.e. malpractice) was
estimated by Brennan et al. (1991) and Thomas et al. (2000) to be on the order of 30%,
bringing the overall estimate of the direct effect of malpractice on health spending to less
than 1% of national health expenditures.
I have presented, therefore, several arguments suggesting that coefficient estimates based
on the NPDB variables could be considered credible even if they partially reflect the mal-
practice rate of the state. These arguments, however, are only necessary in the first place if
the NPDB variables do truly reflect the malpractice rate – a possibility that is not supported
by previous research. In fact, two large studies of the connection between medical negligence
(i.e. malpractice) in American hospitals and malpractice allegations – the first step of the
relationship between actual malpractice and adverse actions or malpractice payments – have
shown that the link between the two is quite weak. The first study, performed in New York
hospitals by Localio et al. (1991), found that a malpractice claim followed an actual example
of malpractice only 1.5% of the time. The second study, by Studdert et al. (2000) and per-
formed in Colorado and Utah hospitals, found a similar estimate of 2.5%. Furthermore, both
studies found that claims of malpractice were frequently made in cases where it was likely no
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malpractice occurred (83% of claims in the New York sample and 78% in the Colorado and
Utah sample). As a result, the authors of the Colorado and Utah study drew the following
conclusions:
“The poor correlation between medical negligence and malpractice claims that
was present in New York in 1984 is also present in Utah and Colorado in 1992.
Paradoxically, the incidence of negligent adverse events exceeds the incidence of
malpractice claims but when a physician is sued, there is a high probability that
it will be for rendering nonnegligent care.” (p. 250)
Another study, national in scope, by Studdert et al. (2006), focused on the relationship
between claims and outcomes of malpractice litigation – the second step of the relationship
between malpractice and adverse actions or malpractice payments. Using data on closed
claims from medical liability insurers, the authors found that 27% of malpractice claims
regarding incidents in which it was judged that malpractice did actually occur resulted in
no payment at all being made to the claimant. Conversely, in cases where no malpractice
occurred, payment was still made 28% of the time. Thus, in cases where a claim is made, the
wrong outcome – i.e. a payment made when it should not be or no payment made when it
should be – is quite a common occurrence. Overall, once a malpractice accusation has been
made, a payment is far from certain. Studdert et al. calculated that 56% of malpractice
claims resulted in a payment being made. Another study by Jena et al. (2011) which had
a much larger sample size, however, estimated this rate to be much lower at less than
22%6. The current processes of accusations, negotiations, and legal mechanisms, therefore,
imposes a strong filter between the actual occurrence of malpractice and the observation of
an outcome in the NPDB. Incidents of actual malpractice rarely result in malpractice claims,
and even when claims are made, payment is estimated to take place as little as 22% of the
time. Furthermore, claims and payments are commonly associated with incidents in which
no malpractice occurred. These facts suggest that if the NPDB variables reflect the influence
of the state’s rate of malpractice, it is a very diluted effect.
2.3 Data
Equation (1) is estimated using a year-by-state (including Washington DC) panel data set
that covers the years 1992 through 2008 and is compiled from several sources. The depen-
dent variable in my regressions is health expenditures by the state of the provider, estimated
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2011) as part of their National Health
6One of the main drawbacks of the work of Jena et al. (2011), though, is that it relies on records of only
one insurer. The insurer was a large one that insured physicians in all states.
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Expenditure Accounts program. The Consumer Price Index7 was used to express these ex-
penditures in 2011 dollars. I use four expenditure categories in my analysis: hospital care,
physician and clinical services, prescription drugs, and other non-durable medical products.
Hospital care accounts for 37% of all expenditures and also reflects the highest risk setting8.
Physician and clinical services reflects 25% of spending, and, broadly speaking, covers ser-
vices provided in outpatient settings. The prescription drugs category includes 10% of total
spending and tallies prescription drug sales in retail settings (drugs administered in hospitals
or physician offices, and included in hospital or office revenue, are included in the hospital
care or physician and clinical services categories). I use the final category, non-durable med-
ical products, for a placebo analysis. This group is much smaller than the other categories
at 2.5% of costs, and is unique in that it covers retail sales of medical products that do
not require prescriptions or other physician input for purchase. Additionally, this category
reflects almost entirely out-of-pocket spending (Medicare pays a small portion) that is at the
consumer’s discretion. Examples of products in this category include over-the-counter drugs
like cough and allergy medicines and medical sundries such as bandages and thermometers.
Legal risks faced by physicians, therefore, would be expected to have no influence on this
category of spending9.
The NPDB variables are calculated using the Public Use Data File of the NPDB (Health
Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of Health Professions, 2011b). By law, the
NPDB collects information on all adverse actions taken against and malpractice payments
made by (or on behalf of) physicians in the country10. Full data collection began at the
start of 1992, the first year I use in my analysis. I use the NPDB to count the number of
unique physicians associated with malpractice payments and adverse actions by state and
year. This includes payments associated with both judgments and settlements, and all types
of adverse actions, regardless of the reason given for why the payment was made or adverse
action taken (even if it was not necessarily related to medical competence)11. However,
7More precisely, I used the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items, with the index
value for June taken as the value for the whole year (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).
8A study of the NPDB by Bishop et al. (2011), using data no longer available to the public, found that
roughly half of all malpractice payments originated in a hospital setting, despite that there are almost 30
times more outpatient visits than hospital discharges.
9See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2010) for detailed discussion of the categorization of
the National Health Expenditure Accounts.
10The National Practitioner Data Bank was established during the presidency of Ronald Reagan by Title IV
of Public Law 99-660 (known as the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986), with final regulations
found in 45 CFR Part 60 (Health Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of Health Professions,
2001).
11There are two justifications for not removing observations on the basis of reason given. First, many
records do not have any reason given – 29% in the case of adverse actions, and 23% for malpractice payment
records. Secondly, and more importantly, it is likely that all actions convey information about the regulatory
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two important restrictions are made in order to avoid double counting. For malpractice
payments, I exclude payments identified as made by “State Funds”, since, according the the
NPDB documentation, these payments are usually made only when a payment has also been
made by an insurer. In the case of adverse actions, I do not count actions that are identified
as modifying previous actions.
The NPDB collects several types of adverse actions, including state licensure actions (e.g.
license probation, suspension, or revocation), exclusions from Medicare and Medicaid, and
more localized actions such as hospital clinical privileges restrictions. Malpractice payments
include those made after trials as part of judgments or jury awards as well as negotiated
settlements. The inclusion of settlements is key to the representativeness of the NPDB since
they make up a huge portion of the malpractice risk faced by physicians. Judgments and jury
awards, in fact, represent less than 3% of the records in my sample of the NPDB. Thanks
to this aspect of the NPDB and the public availability of portions of its data, numerous
researchers have made use of it before (e.g., Baicker and Chandra, 2005; Baicker et al., 2007;
Bishop et al., 2011).
A natural question to ask when using a dataset like the NPDB is whether it is truly
representative of the underlying incidence of malpractice payments and adverse actions. In
theory, the law requiring the report of all such events implies that the data should reflect
the entire universe, but this could only be true if the required reporting actually takes
place. Jena et al. (2011) studied the issue by comparing the malpractice payments data of
the NPDB over the period of 1991 to 2005 to data they obtained from a large, national
malpractice liability insurer, finding that differences between the two sources were small.
No study of the representativeness of the adverse actions data has been performed to my
knowledge. However, more than 83% of records originate from state licensing boards or
Medicare/Medicaid, groups which seem likely to report according to the requirements of the
law.12
Regardless of the extent to which the NPDB reflects the true, underlying incidence of
malpractice payments and adverse actions, the NPDB is the appropriate data for my analysis
regime regardless of the basis for the action (e.g. what types of actions lead to adverse actions or payments,
and how costly the punishment or payment could be).
12The United States General Accounting Office (2000) (GAO) criticized the NPDB for a number of issues,
but most notably suggested that it might suffer from under-reporting. This critique was not based on any
actual observation of under-reporting, and was undermined in the case of malpractice payments by the later-
published work of Jena et al. (2011). For adverse actions, the critique was based on the fact that reporting
by hospitals was far below the level expected before the creation of the NPDB, but these expectations were
necessarily not based on any data source, and may very well have been completely unreasonable. If this type
of under-reporting is truly an issue, though, it is likely it would have only minimal impact on measurement
of adverse actions in my analysis since my adverse action variable is dominated by the actions of licensing
boards and Medicare/Medicaid, organizations that were not subject to the GAO’s critique.
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since it is the best available measure of physicians’ perceptions of the risk they face. The
NPDB represents plays an important role in making information about malpractice payments
and adverse actions public, both through the publicly available data and its use by health
care organizations during credentialing processes. Thus, the NPDB itself is the object that I
need to measure for my analysis – not the underlying incidence of risk that the NPDB intends
to measure, rendering the question of representativeness of the NPDB to be somewhat less
important in this case.
Besides the NPDB variables, I use figures from the American Bar Association (2012, 2009)
for the number of active attorneys in the state. Additionally, I rely on several sources of
data for proxies for the production cost of medical services. State level population figures are
obtained from Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau (2002, 2009). The number of active
medical doctors (excluding those employed by the federal government) comes from the Area
Resource File (Health Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of Health Professions,
2011a). Frequency counts for the number of state residents with private insurance, Medicare,
or Medicaid, were tabulated by the author from IPUMS CPS data for march of each year
(King et al., 2010).
Summary statistics for all the variables used in my analysis can be found in Tables 1
through 3. Table 1 presents statistics on the categories of spending used as dependent
variables in terms of millions of (real) dollars. Table 2 presents the same statistics for the
natural log of these spending categories, which is the actual form of the variables that are
used in my estimations. Table 3 reports statistics for the right hand side variables in my
regressions. Note that in this table, the statistics for lawyers and non-federally employed
physicians are presented in their true levels, as opposed to their use in my regressions, where
the values are in thousands.
2.4 Results
Table 5 presents the results of my estimation of equation (1) on my sample of state health
expenditures. Each category of health spending has estimates for each of two versions of
(1), one with coincidently timed control variables and one in which all controls are lagged
one period (that is, NPDBs,t−1 and Xs,t−1 replace their period t versions in equation (1)).
The lag version of the model is intended as a check for reverse causality between health care
spending and the coincidently timed control variables (especially the non-NPDB control
variables, since they do not share the lag feature of the NPDB variables discussed in section
2.2).
Focusing first on the hospital care spending category, column (1) presents the model
10
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with coincident independent variables. I estimate that, on average, one additional physician
suffering an adverse action in a year results in a reduction of state hospital expenditures by 1.3
hundredths of a percent, a result that is statistically significant at the 1% significance level.
Relative to the average annual state-level spending on hospital care over my sample period
(approximately $11.5 billion), this estimate represents a decrease of about $1.5 million. For a
change equal to the average, year-to-year, within-state change of 16, this estimate represents
a reduction of almost 21 hundredths of a percent, or nearly $24 million. In contrast to this
result, though, the coefficient for malpractice payments is not statistically significant and is
quite close to zero. In fact, the estimate for malpractice payments is more than 225 times
smaller than the adverse actions estimate. Given the conventional wisdom in the medical
field that fear of malpractice lawsuits is an important determinant of cost, this result is
surprising. That said, it is consistent with the view that broad use of malpractice insurance
leaves little reason for physicians to alter their behavior out of fear of litigation.
Column (2) presents my estimates for the hospital care regression using lagged values
of the right hand side variables. Here, the pattern is nearly identical to column (1), with
adverse actions statistically significantly estimated (at the 1% significance level) to reduce
spending by 1.6 hundredths of a percent, a decrease of approximately $1.8 million (for a
change equal to the average, year-to-year change: decrease of 25.0 hundredths or almost $29
million). Malpractice payments are estimated to have a negligible effect that is insignificant
at conventional levels. Even the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for the malprac-
tice payments coefficient is only 40% of the magnitude of the estimate for adverse actions.
One interesting point to take away from these regressions is that, even though the effect of
adverse actions is small relative to the size of hospital care spending in a state, it is large
relative to the estimate for the population effect, with estimates for adverse actions in both
versions of the model more than doubling the estimates for increasing state population by a
thousand residents.
Turning to my estimates for spending on physician and clinical services in columns (3)
and (4), I find that adverse actions are again estimated to reduce spending. The estimate
for the coincident model is -0.7 hundredths and is not significant, though the lagged model
is -1.2 hundredths and is significant at the 10% level. These coefficient estimates correspond
to dollar valued effects of -$9 million and -$15 million, respectively, for an average-level
increase in adverse actions and when evaluated at the category’s sample average annual state-
level spending of $7.8 billion. Although the point estimates for this category are somewhat
smaller than the estimates for the hospital care category, an important reason for the change
in significance between categories is that these estimates are less precise, with standard
errors increasing by a third and a half for the coincident and lagged models, respectively.
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Comparison with the population effect point estimates for this category still suggests that
these estimates have meaningful size, since one additional physician suffering an adverse
action results in a change in spending of approximately the same magnitude as increasing
the state population by a thousand.
The estimates for malpractice payments for the physician and clinical services category
are notably different from the estimates for the other two categories. The coefficient estimate
of -0.8 hundredths in the coincidental controls model is statistically significant at the 5%
significance level, a decrease of 0.20% or nearly $16 million for an increase of 26 malpractice
payments, the average, year-to-year, within-state change in malpractice payments. The
lagged model estimate is similar in magnitude at -0.5 hundredths (-$0.4 million), though
in this case it is not statistically significant. These estimates are considerably larger (in
percentage terms) than those for the hospital care and prescription drug categories, and
the coincident model result is the only case where I find a statistically significant change in
response to malpractice payments. As I will discuss below, however, the regressions I run
which include leads for the NPDB variables suggest that this outcome may be influenced
by endogeneity bias, which could help explain the inconsistency of these estimates with the
other categories.
The next set of regression estimates, for the prescription drug category, can be found in
columns (5) and (6) of Table 5. The pattern of estimates in this case is quite similar to that
of the hospital care category. The model with coincident regressors estimates a statistically
insignificant 1.1 hundredths of a percent reduction due to adverse actions. For an average-
level change, this corresponds to a reduction of 17 hundredths or $5.5 million (relative to
the spending category sample average of $3.2 billion). The lagged model estimates this same
coefficient as -1.8 hundredths (-0.29% or -$9.3 million for average-level change), which is
significant at the 5% level. These point estimates are nominally close to the estimates from
the hospital care category, and, also like the hospital care category, are large relative to
the effect of population on spending. In both models in this category, the adverse action
estimate is more than four times larger than the population estimate. Thus, the differences in
statistical significance between the hospital care category and this one seem to be primarily
driven by a drop in the precision of the estimates (standard errors are more than 60% larger
than the hospital care category).
Focusing next on the malpractice payment estimates, I again find that the coefficients are
negative, though neither case is statistically significantly different from zero. The estimated
reductions of 0.2 and 0.4 hundredths of a percent in columns (5) and (6), respectively, both
correspond to drops of approximately $2 to $3 million in category spending for average-level
increases of 26 payments. As in the case of the hospital care category, the magnitudes of
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these estimates are much smaller (at about a quarter in size) than those for the adverse action
estimates. This is again consistent with the reasoning that the availability of malpractice
insurance reduces physician responsiveness to the likelihood of malpractice payments13.
2.4.1 Placebo analysis
Regression results for a final spending category, other non-durable medical products, are
presented in columns (7) and (8) of Table 5. These results serve as a placebo analysis,
since we should not expect to observe an effect of physician risk avoidance behavior on this
type of health care spending. If there is no endogeneity bias, we would expect to estimate
coefficients for adverse actions and malpractice payments equal to zero. On the other hand,
if endogeneity is causing bias (and spurious statistically significant estimates in my main
regressions) then we would expect to see significant, non-zero estimates when the placebo
category is the dependent variable as well14.
This analysis is a credible check of endogeneity to the extent that the dependent variables
in my main regressions and the placebo regressions share the same unobserved determinants
that may bias coefficient estimates. To that end, state-by-year correlations between other
non-durable medical products and the other categories suggest that the groups share similar
trends over time. They are 0.94, 0.97, and 0.87 for hospital care, physician and clinical
services, and prescription drugs, respectively (0.17, 0.19, and 0.33 for first-differences).
Despite these correlations, the effects of the NPDB variables observed in the main anal-
yses do not appear to carry over in the non-durable medical products case. As columns
(7) and (8) show, neither model estimates statistically significant effects for these variables,
casting doubt on the possible influence of unobserved factors. Additionally, unlike the esti-
mates for the other categories, which were generally negatively signed for the NPDB variable
coefficients, the estimates in this case are positive, suggesting that if there are unobserved
factors, they would seem to be working in the opposite direction of the results in the main
analyses.
2.4.2 Checking for endogeneity of the regulatory environment
Panel A of Table 6 presents results for the estimation of a variation of equation (1) which
includes one-period-forward leads for the adverse action and malpractice payments variables
13The prescription drug category models have noticeably larger estimates for the effect of the physician
population on spending. While it is hard to be sure why this differs so much from the other categories, there
has been previous research documenting a link between physician geographical concentration and increased
sale of prescription drugs, e.g. Bruckner et al. (2012).
14Examples of previous uses of placebo analyses can be found in Hamersma and Kim (2009) and Bitler
and Carpenter (2012).
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(in addition to the coincidently timed versions of those variables). This is intended to address
the possibility that the malpractice risk environment itself is a response to conditions in the
state. If the NPDB variables are not endogenous, then one would expect that their lead
values would estimate as insignificantly different from zero, and estimates of the coincident
values of the NPDB variables would be similar to when the models are estimated without
leads15.
The results for the hospital care and prescription drug spending categories (columns (1)
and (3)) have a similar pattern. The coefficient estimates for the coincident version of the
adverse actions variable are both statistically significant (1% level for hospital care and 10%
level for prescription drugs) and have magnitudes that are similar to my main estimates in
Table 5. Additionally, the estimates for the adverse actions lead are not significant and are
small in comparison to the coincident version estimates. For hospital care, the lead variable
estimate is 34% of the coincident estimate, while for prescription drugs that ratio is 14%. For
malpractice payments, neither the coincident nor lead versions have statistically significant
estimates in these categories. The estimates are also comparatively small relative to the
adverse action estimates, a finding that is consistent with the results of Table 5. For the
placebo category, other non-durable medical products, the addition of lead variables does not
lead to any interpretive changes. All estimates for this category are statistically insignificant,
and magnitudes are similar Table 5 estimates. All of these facts undercut the possibility that
the results for these categories found in Table 5 are driven by an endogenous response of the
malpractice risk environment to health care spending or other conditions in a state.
The physician and clinical services category, however, has a different story. As is im-
mediately noticeable, the lead variable estimate for malpractice payments is statistically
significant (1% level) and comparatively large at approximately -1 hundredth of a percent.
Moreover, the coincident version is not significant and has a much smaller magnitude than
the estimates found in Table 5. Additionally, the point estimate for the lead version of
the adverse actions is about 50% larger in terms of magnitude than the coincident version
(though neither version of the adverse actions variable has a significant coefficient). These
results suggest that there might be some remaining issues with endogeneity in this spending
category that my models are not completely eliminating. In the case of malpractice pay-
ments, this would seem to explain the statistically significant estimate in Table 5, a result
that at first glance seemed out of place due to its dissimilarity with the other categories.
15Two notable previous uses of this type of strategy to address endogeneity can be found in Gruber and
Hanratty (1995) and Friedberg (1998).
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2.4.3 The effect of big states
To check whether the effects estimated in Table 5 are being driven by the large states,
Panel B of Table 6 presents results for the re-estimation of (1) after excluding the largest
states in my panel. The excluded states were California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio, all of which had average populations over the period of my sample
of more than 10 million. Each state also exceeded $66 billion in average annual health care
spending.
The pattern of point estimates is similar to that of Table 5. The most notable magnitude
differences are that the adverse action estimate for hospital care spending is about 40%
smaller than it was in Table 5, while the malpractice payments estimates for physician and
clinical services and prescription drugs increased by more than 40% and 300%, respectively.
The estimate for malpractice payments in the placebo category, other non durable medical
products, also increased in magnitude, rising to 0.9 hundredths, though its adverse action
estimate fell to less than a third of the Table 5 estimate. The dropping of observations,
though, also resulted in a much lower level of precision for the estimates, so none of the
estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels. Nevertheless, the pattern of
results seem to suggest that health care spending effects of malpractice risk are not drastically
different between the smaller and larger states.
3 Conclusion
I have presented evidence suggesting that the practice of defensive medicine may result in
decreases in overall average health care spending at the state-level. In particular, I find
that rising frequencies of adverse actions against physicians are associated with statistically
significant spending decreases in the hospital care and prescription drug categories. My esti-
mates for effects of increasing frequencies of malpractice payments are smaller in comparison
to the adverse action estimates and, except for one case, are all statistically insignificant at
conventional levels. The one significant estimate indicated a negative effect on spending in
the physician and clinical services category, though there is some evidence that there might
be endogeneity issues affecting the estimates for this category. These results are particu-
larly interesting in light of the fact that physicians are insured against malpractice litigation
risk, but are not insured against adverse actions. Since impediments to their free ability to
practice are very costly to physicians, it is not hard to believe that they would be sensitive
to changes in the adverse action threat levels. Additionally, finding that malpractice risk
emanating from industry oversight groups is associated with decreases in spending is notable
15
S. Barkowski: Does Defensive Medicine Reduce Health Care Spending?
given that the medical community has long argued that litigation risk leads to higher health
care costs.
There are several mechanisms through which greater fear of punishment or litigation for
physicians could result in lower spending levels. Doctors could increase their use of preventa-
tive services, leading to fewer cases of more serious (and expensive) illnesses. Alternatively,
increased risk could induce physicians to take greater precaution when providing services,
leading to fewer errors that require costly additional care. Yet another possibility is doc-
tors may reduce their use of risky services that have low marginal value to the health of
the patient (or, more cynically, reduce their use of risky procedures regardless of the value
to the health of the patient). The true explanation could even be a combination of these
mechanisms and others. This paper, though, makes no attempt to distinguish between mech-
anisms, and given that previous research has been mixed on the issue of how varying levels
of risk influence physician behavior, there is room for additional research on this point.
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Table 1: Dependent variable summary statistics, by expenditure category
(Millions of June 2011 dollars)
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Hospital care 11,523 12,556 620 75,931
Physician & clinical services 7,818 9,671 297 67,725
Prescription drugs 3,159 3,745 123 24,588
Other non-durable medical products 795 925 49 5,044
All four categories combined 23,296 26,435 1,093 172,212
Observations 867
Table 2: Log-scale dependent variable summary statistics, by expenditure category
(Log of millions of June 2011 dollars)
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Hospital care 8.8556 1.0191 6.4301 11.2376
Physician & clinical services 8.3948 1.0933 5.6934 11.1232
Prescription drugs 7.4512 1.1617 4.8112 10.1100
Other non-durable medical products 6.1145 1.1074 3.8851 8.5259
Observations 867
Table 3: Independent variable summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Physicians suffering adverse actions 66 77 0 632
Physicians with malpractice payments 240 338 10 1,838
Practicing lawyers 19,512 26,124 1,093 150,542
Non-Federally Employed Physicians (M.D.s) 13,654 16,454 640 95,906
Population (’000s) 5,515 6,130 466 36,580
Privately insured residents (’000s) 3,870 4,041 324 23,382
Medicare residents (’000s) 737 780 25 4,240
Medicaid residents (’000s) 652 880 31 6,398
Observations 867
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Table 4: Additional summary statistics: absolute values of year-to-year changes
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Physicians suffering adverse actions 16 29 0 344
Physicians with malpractice payments 26 43 0 410
Observations 816
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Table 5: Regression results by health care spending category
Dependent variable is the log of category health care spending
All estimates are multiplied by 10,000 (i.e. they are expressed in hundredths of a percent)
Other Non-Durable
Hospital Physician & Clinical Prescription Medical Products
Care Services Drugs (Placebo Category)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Timing of regressors Coincident Lagged Coincident Lagged Coincident Lagged Coincident Lagged
(relative to dependent variable)
Physicians suffering adverse actions -1.295∗∗∗ -1.561∗∗∗ -0.715 -1.202∗ -1.083 -1.840∗∗ 0.889 0.778
(0.461) (0.463) (0.615) (0.702) (0.756) (0.746) (0.939) (0.920)
Physicians with malpractice payments 0.00574 0.0195 -0.779∗∗ -0.528 -0.249 -0.392 0.142 0.0747
(0.303) (0.305) (0.384) (0.434) (0.618) (0.558) (0.929) (0.808)
Practicing lawyers (’000s) -6.617 1.343 -12.51 -10.23 30.13∗∗∗ 17.81∗∗ 27.19∗∗∗ 27.70∗∗∗
(6.089) (6.685) (9.915) (9.346) (9.906) (7.926) (8.937) (8.344)
Non-federally employed physicians (’000s) 77.32 42.96 8.317 16.39 277.0∗∗∗ 224.6∗∗∗ -14.38 -4.511
(59.33) (55.19) (59.63) (63.96) (87.70) (74.99) (85.61) (89.19)
Population (’000s) 0.600∗ 0.565∗∗ -0.873 -1.049 0.267 0.417 0.00400 -0.603
(0.324) (0.274) (0.874) (0.855) (0.864) (0.731) (0.880) (0.744)
Privately insured residents (’000s) -0.0330 0.0920 -0.0355 0.0700 0.241∗ 0.277∗ 0.331 0.273
(0.0990) (0.0903) (0.134) (0.164) (0.131) (0.149) (0.210) (0.214)
Medicare insured residents (’000s) 0.0745 0.0145 -0.262 -0.184 0.0743 0.343 0.0955 -0.122
(0.207) (0.255) (0.346) (0.314) (0.362) (0.436) (0.469) (0.525)
Medicaid insured residents (’000s) 0.193 -0.0461 0.370∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.293 -0.109 0.101 0.208
(0.132) (0.148) (0.203) (0.197) (0.234) (0.251) (0.284) (0.278)
Observations 867 816 867 816 867 816 867 816
Adjusted R2 0.978 0.979 0.961 0.959 0.991 0.990 0.837 0.830
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at state-level) in parentheses. Conventional levels of statistical significance (for two-tailed tests) indicated as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions also included year and state fixed effects and state-specific, linear time-trends that are not reported.
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Table 6: Robustness checks of regression results
Dependent variable is the log of category health care spending
All estimates are multiplied by 10,000 (i.e. they are expressed in hundredths of a percent)
Panel A: Including Leads Panel B: Excluding Big States
Other Non- Other Non-
Durable Durable
Physician Medical Physician Medical
& Products & Products
Hospital Clinical Prescription (Placebo Hospital Clinical Prescription (Placebo
Care Services Drugs Category) Care Services Drugs Category)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Physicians suffering adverse actions -1.107∗∗ -0.398 -1.190∗ 0.576 -0.761 -0.867 -1.781 -0.265
(0.431) (0.582) (0.693) (0.806) (0.838) (1.253) (1.161) (1.764)
Physicians with malpractice payments 0.102 -0.356 -0.285 0.0307 0.164 -1.096 -0.795 0.935
(0.239) (0.296) (0.474) (0.621) (0.459) (0.846) (0.674) (0.707)
Physicians suffering adverse actions -0.377 -0.607 -0.169 0.594 −− −− −− −−
(Lead variable) (0.413) (0.657) (0.882) (0.753)
Physicians with malpractice payments -0.195 -0.968∗∗∗ 0.253 0.210 −− −− −− −−
(Lead variable) (0.305) (0.280) (0.537) (0.738)
Observations 816 816 816 816 748 748 748 748
Adjusted R2 0.977 0.960 0.991 0.856 0.979 0.960 0.991 0.842
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at state-level) in parentheses. Conventional levels of statistical significance (for two-tailed tests) indicated as ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Regressions also included all other control variables, fixed effects, and time-trends that were included in the models reported in Table 5. Regressions in
Panel B excluded records for California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, which all had average populations over my sample period greater
than 10 million. These seven states also had the highest average annual health care spending, each exceeding $66 billion.
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